http://www.politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/424
Muhammad
Moheq[1]
Editor-in-Chief:
Hasht-e-Subh Daily Newspaper,
Kabul, Afghanistan
Riad
Amiraoui[2]
Emir
Abdelkader University
Algeria
Bashir
Ansari[3]
Organization
of Islamic Cooperation
Saudi
Arabia
TALIBAN AND ISIS: AN
ANALYTICAL COMPARISON
Abstract:
A complex
relationship between Taliban and ISI is often assumed, and with a few
exceptions, but it has not been yet systematically investigated. In this paper
we will attempt to compare the two groups in the areas of their social origins,
how each appeared in the Islamic arena, organizational characteristics, the influence
of other ideological movements or tribal mechanisms on their organizational
system, political agenda, faith, theology, jurisprudence, ethics, and Mysticism
by exploring the commonalities and differences that exist between the two
groups. This paper also contributes towards the conceptualization of the
immediate and long-term political and security implications of the Taliban's
return to power. In addition to that, the paper discusses the relations of
these two groups with the ethnic fabric of their societies and their
relationship with the rest of the ideological movements in the Islamic world. These
two groups cannot be understood without delving into the deep roots of their theological
foundations
Keywords:
Taliban, ISIS, Dayesh, Terrorism, Extremism.
Introduction
After
spending more than 2 trillion USD and causing more than 220,000 war deaths, America
retreated from the Afghanistan in 2021(MIR, T. O. The Events in Afghanistan
2021). The Taliban took over Kabul in just 10 days after taking over the first
province of Afghanistan.[4]
A year
after the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, the academic debates and policy
discussion regarding the origins, similarities, and distinction of Islamist
insurgencies and terrorist groups in the Islamic world has gained new momentum.
Many assume that the symbolism of the West's failure in the "War on
Terror" and the Taliban's triumph could reenergize terrorist groups like
the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham or ISIS, creating another cycle of violence,
fragility, and conflict in the South, Central, and West Asia.
To understand the immediate and long-term
political and security implications of the Taliban's return to power on the
re-emergence of ISIS, one should understand the theoretical and structural
similarities and differences between the Taliban and ISIS. By examining the
social origins, organizational characteristics, dominating political
worldviews, theological genealogy, and jurisprudential theories of the Taliban
and ISIS, this paper argues that there is an overwhelming commonality in the
mission and purpose of these two organizations.
The Social origins of the Taliban and ISIS
ISIS has been around
since 2004 and currently has 15.000 members who are actively involved.
Historically, the origin of ISIS cannot be separated from Tauhid wa al-Jihad,
the organization that opposed the American and coalition forces. The Tauhid wa
al-Jihad allied with several kabilah and tribes in Iraq in October 2006. The
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) was established by the coalition of Tauhid wa
al-Jihad and other Iraqi tribes, and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi was chosen as its
leader.[5]In
2010, Aby Umar al-Baghdadi was killed, and ISI was inherited by Abu Bakar
al-Husseini al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi. He expanded his military operations to
Syria in April 2013 in collaboration with rebel group of Jabhat al Nusra.[6]After
the death of Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda forced al-Baghdadi to instruct his
army to leave Syria and because of this disagreement, on 17 April 2013, ISI
officially separated itself from Al-Qaeda and rebranded itself in ISIS (Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria).[7]Contrary to the ISIS, the origin of Taliban can be traced
back to the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. After Russian
withdrawal, the quest for power and supremacy in Afghanistan led to a conflict
of interests among different groups, which dragged Afghanistan into civil war.[8]The
civil war ended in 1996 with the victory of the Taliban, who ruled the country
until the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and ousted them from power However, the existence of ISIS in
Afghanistan has exacerbated the Afghan conflict as its success will have grave consequences
for peace and stability.[9]
Knowing
the social origin of political organizations is crucial in decoding the
political and social practices, characters, and worldviews. For ISIS, 65.4%of
the ISIS recruits and members were from middle-class roots, with 18.7% and 3.8%
coming from working and upper-class families, respectively. These
urban middle-class youths were driven by the Salafist interpretation of Islamic
texts and traditions. In Iraq, for instance, most of those who joined Daesh,
the Arabic name of ISIS, were either urban Salafi youths or members of the
Baath Party, whose religious fervor gained more strength after the invasion of
Kuwait and the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991.[10]In
Syria, too, most ISIS recruits urbanites with modern education. The
overwhelming majority of nearly 40 thousand foreign recruits of ISIS were also
educated and were familiar with modern technologies and material
representations of today's civilizations.[11]However,
the Taliban members come from impoverished rural communities that are mostly
incompatible with urban values and find peace in returning to rural and
desert values.
ISIS has
a defined vision and objective, whereas the Taliban's demands remain vague. In
other words, the Taliban, a primitive group, knows what they do not want but
not what they do. The Taliban rejects the entirety nation-state based on modern
urban values and characteristics, whether they are political, legal, or
technical. In defining their ideal political system, they employ non-measureable,
non-technical, and frequently meaningless phrases. ISIS, unlike the Taliban,
knows both what it wants and what it does not want.[12]
The
ambiguity of what the Taliban wants lures many who might be able to impose
their agenda on them. For example, Pashtun nationalists aim to turn the group
into a formidable political force capable of enforcing Pashtun ethnic hegemony
and managing the conflicting interest of countries like Russia, Pakistan,
India, China, and the United States in Afghanistan.[13]
In the
eyes of Pashtun nationalists, the Taliban looks like a giant robot. If they
succeed in hacking its software, they can easily manipulate and use it for
their purposes and interests. Because of this growing obsession with the
useability of the Taliban, so many foreign players are tempted to invest in the
group.[14]However,
the organizational and political rigidness of ISIS is not alluring in this
sense, and no one bothers to deal with it. As an organization, ISIS has the
historical experience of al-Qaeda and jihadist Salafism in its memory and
considers itself the best successor to those groups. The founders of Daesh,
such as Abu Musab Zarqawi, Abu Hamzah Muhajir, Abu Omar Baghdadi, and then Abu
Bakr Baghdadi, have their intellectual and organizational descent from the same
groups.[15]
Interestingly,
the same feature and political characteristic of ISIS, which terrifies global
powers and discourages engagement with the group, attracts the more stubborn
elements among the fundamentalist groups, including the Taliban, and significantly
increases ISIS' recruitment potential across the Islamist spectrum. The
recruits consider the Taliban an unprincipled opportunistic organization that,
under Islamic slogans, betrayed the cause of Jihad, signed a peace deal with
the US, facilitated its safe exit from Afghanistan, and is ready to deal with
any other foreign power.
Organizational Characteristics
The
organizational model of ISIS combines the hierarchal leftist and clandestine
Islamist extremist organizations such as Al-Jihad, Al-Qaeda, etc. In the 1960s
and 70s, other groups such as Al-Jamaa al-Islami, Al-Jihad al-Islami, and
Al-Takfir and Hijra also embraced the model. In this organizational model, the
leader is placed at the top of the pyramid, followed by the leadership council
members, committees, local operatives, and various on-the-ground branches of
the organization. To survive the powerful and repressive security and
intelligence institutions and systems across the Middle East, the left and
Islamist organizations, throughout their operations, have become more
complicated and agile.[16]
In Iraq,
for instance, to survive the US-led international military campaign, Daesh
masterfully combined the heritage or organizational resilience of the Ba’ath
Party and the security and intelligence apparatus of the collapsed government
of Saddam Hussein. As a result, Daesh survived despite the several casualties
and confronting formidable enemies such as the United States and Iran. To
understand the Daesh’s organizational and structural resilience, one should
consider its similarities with the communist, fascist, and other Islamist
organizations.[17]
Unlike
ISIS, The Taliban are deep rooted in Pakistan's Deobandi Islamic madrassas.
Except for the Haqqani Network, the rest of the Taliban are unfamiliar with the
modern organization. Initially, the Haqqanis were too unfamiliar with modern
organizational systems and structures. Some evidence suggests that throughout
the last two decades, Pakistani intelligence officers have trained and prepared
Haqqanis, aiming to present them as a successful example to Kashmiri, Uighur,
Chechen, and other fundamentalist armed forces in the region.[18]
The
organizational model of the main body of the Taliban is a combination of the
hierarchical pyramid of Sheikh Al-Hadith-major Talib-minor Talib and the macro
clan/village lord-farmer. This model is rooted in the traditions of pre-modern
societies and belongs to the mysterious old world, filled with the ancients'
myths and legends. In the hierarchy within Deobandi schools, the senior
teacher, often the sheikh al-Hadith, is considered the spiritual successor of
the Prophet Mohammad and the inheritor of his spiritual legacy. Based on this
perception, the religious status of Sheikh al-Hadith is like those of Prophet Mohammad's
companions. Therefore, ordinary people are unbelievers who must be guided to
the truth. There is only one problem with the fundamentals of this notion. The
Sheikh al-Hadith is not exactly a prophet, his disciples are not the Prophet's
companions, and people are not unbelievers. Some understand this juxtaposition
but consider the Sheikh al-Hadith as a spiritual and semi-sacred figure
regardless of it. The Sheikh al-Hadith senior students have the fortune of
succeeding him, and younger students should follow the method and character of
their elders and masters as much as possible. In this model, centralized
power is formed secretly. The limits of authority in power are not clear.
However, informally, the students are morally obliged to obey the orders issued
by Sheikh Al-Hadith. It is a sin to oppose them, even if Sheikh al-Hadith
orders to close schools and declare Jihad, as happened in Pakistan in the
1990s.
The
Taliban organization model is built based on the Deobandi madrassas structure.
In exercising power elements of that organizational model mix with the
Taliban's tribal characteristics. The Taliban leader's spiritual status blends
into the character of the head of the tribe, creating a cocktail of
spiritual-tribal power and influence. No one knows whether the name Hibatullah,
God's awe, was chosen for the mysterious and unseen leader of the Taliban
coincidently or intentionally. Some argue that Hibatullah is a pseudo name for
him. Either way, the name's literal meaning conveys the notion that the
authority of Amirul Momineen is an embodiment of awe and the glory of God. Even
another form of his name, Hibat Allah, which often surfaces in the Taliban
documents, means divine gift. That also has an aspect of divineness and
holiness in it.[19]
Whether
the whole persona of Hibatullah is real or fictional, some believe that like
Mullah Omar, the founder of the Taliban, the current supreme leader of the
group possesses no actual power and influence over the group, and the
organization is run and managed by the leading architects of the Taliban
project. Overall, the Taliban's penetrable organizational structure and the
ambiguity of the group's political mission have created hype among foreign
players to recruit the Taliban for their grand political projects in South and
Central Asia.
Political Agenda
The
Political Agenda has been defined as the list of issues significant enough to
be addressed (Walgrave et al., 2008, p. 815). The agenda of political
organizations enable political players to engage or disengage with a particular
organization. Daesh, for instance, has a clear and well-defined mandate. It
wants to establish and expand the Islamic caliphate and rule the Islamic world
and establish Muslim Umma based on Sharia law. In a Trumpian sense, they intend
to revive Islam and restore it in its former glory. However, Daesh's medieval
vision of establishing a fanatical Sunni Islamic caliphate is not attainablethat
indicates the disconnect and multifaceted nativity of Daesh ideologies with
realities of modern global power and politics.Nevertheless, the mission and
agenda remain the same in the eyes of ISIS followers.[20]
Interestingly,
Daesh does not require a theory or articulation of its political objectives.
Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, and others, have
postulated the idea of an Islamic caliphate decades before the emergence of
ISIS. They did the work for ISIS. The only difference between Daesh and other
fundamentalist groups is its pragmatism in doing what others were passively
theorizing. In fact, by establishing the short-lived Islamic caliphate in Iraq
and Syria between 2014-2018, Deash outperformed and outsmarted its rival within
the Islamic world, creating further division and competition. Daesh's global
political agenda has threatened the sociopolitical status, networks, and
resources of the rest of the Islamist groups worldwide.[21]
Unlike
Daesh, the Taliban lacks theoretical depth as they are not capable of
theorizing its vision. The group's leaders and so-called ideologues are
illiterate and rural Pashtuns with minimum to zero knowledge of Islamic legal
systems, history, and governance. Unlike most other fundamentalist groups that
have emerged spontaneously, the Taliban is a byproduct of the US-led global
project of countering the Soviets during the Cold War. Once Pakistan's
intelligence agencies suspended their investment in former Jihadi parties of
Afghanistan after the collapse of the last communist regime in Kabul, they
nurtured the Taliban and propelled them into the scene as a group that did not
have a political agenda of its own. Therefore, establishing an Islamic
caliphate or aspiring transitional Islamic ambition has never been part of the
initial design of the Taliban. However, It doesn't mean that the Taliban
does not have any political agenda. Any military group with the ability to
exert power, even if it lacks national support or legitimacy, develops a
self-governing logic throughout its maturing process and Taliban is no
exception.[22]
Now, the
Taliban pursue two strategic objectives simultaneously. One is the group's
ethnic agenda that focuses on building a Pashtun-only polity by excluding other
ethnic groups like Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras and removing any possibility of
their meaningful political participation in matters of national significance.
They do this under the disguise of Islam. The second strategic objective is to
form strategic alliances with the rest of the Islamic fundamentalist groups
when and if their rule in Afghanistan is consolidated. They are pursuing these
two strategic objectives in two phases. In the first phase, they want to end
the internal conflict over power in Afghanistan through violence and
suppression. In the second phase, they want to become a transitional Islamic
force taking over the leadership of other jihadist groups in the region and the
Islamic world.[23]
The idea
of the Islamic World leadership is a tempting notion for so many Islamist
organizations, parties, and polities in the Islamic world. From the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, Erdogan's Turkey, and Qatar have long been competing to become the ultimate
leader of the Islamic world. Of course, not all of them have equally explicitly
expressed their ambitions. However, their strategic positioning and investment
in the rival military and political organizations indicates that leadership of
the Islamic world remains a battleground for all, including the Taliban. They believe
they have defeated the world's only superpower, purified Afghanistan' society,
and removed all non-Islamic manifestations of life, culture, and politics.
Therefore, they assume to be the most qualified contender to lead the Islamic
world and unify all fundamentalist groups under a single banner.
Nevertheless, given the Taliban's
inherent incapacity to govern and their ties with international terrorism, the
group leadership pretended they had no political agenda beyond Afghanistan.
They know that any indication of a transnational and global Islamic ambition at
this stage will unite the world and lead to their defeat, as it did after the
9/11 attacks in 2001. The nature of power is such that it is never contained by
itself. The Taliban will never stop aspiring to become an Islamic hegemon
knowing thatthey have the resources and opportunity to form a mega-state that
is capable of sponsoring and harboring Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists
worldwide. The return of Al-Qaida's leadership to Kabul following the collapse
of Afghanistan's republic on August 15, 2021, is a testament to the Taliban's
conviction of becoming an Islamic hegemon.[24]
In this
sense, there is no fundamental difference between ISIS and the Taliban. The
minor difference between them is that Daesh does not have an ethnic agenda and
has opened its doors to all tribes from the first day and has gone straight to
establishing a caliphate. In contrast, the Taliban are focused on consolidating
their ethnic rule first and establishing a caliphate afterward.
Faith and Theology
Ideologically,
ISIS belongs to the broad spectrum of Salafism. The lineage of Salafism goes to
Ahl al-Hadith, meaning the people of hadith, whose enmity with Ahl Rai,
proponents of the use of independent legal reasoning to arrive at legal
decisions, dates to the first centuries of Islamic history. The most crucial
difference between these school of thoughtswas how to interpret the Qur'an and
accept the traditions attributed to the Prophet of Islam. The Ahl al-Rai were
inclined towards a rational interpretation of the Qur'an and strictness in
getting narrations, but the Ahl al-Hadith was the opposite. This difference of
opinion showed itself more than anything else in theological matters, which was
called aqaid or faith by Ahl al-hadith, and Ilm al-Kalām or
science of discourse/theology by the Ahl Rai.[25]
The science
of discourse or Theology was the rational formulation of belief
propositions. At the same time, Ahl al-Hadith considered this work illegal and
emphasized the formulation of belief based on the appearance of verses and
hadiths. Theology was the most critical matter of faith that caused a
difference of opinion. The theology of Ahl al-Hadith was based on the
appearance of texts and depicted God in a human form, having hands, feet,
fingers, face, eyes, and the like, and sitting, standing, leaning on the
throne, on the shoulders of angels. In Ahl al-Hadith's theology, God would be
carried away. He would get angry; he would be happy; he would laugh; he would
reconsider his actions; he would change his mind after knowing the results of a
task, and so on. This image of God was the abstract form of earthly kings
projected and attributed to God. The theology of Ahl al-Hadith was placed in
the category of likeness and embodiment theology, and their critics called them
likeness and embodiment. Several researchers, such as Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid,
consider this type of theology to be a type of pagan theology, which depicts
God in an embodied form and representation.[26]
Ahl
al-Rai, which includes Mu'tazila, Matridi Hanifis, and several philosophers and
mystics, regardless of some differences in the details, established their
theology based on tanziyyah, which is the opposite of Ahl al-Hadith's theology.
According to Ahl al-Rai, the divine world is fundamentally different from the
material world as humans do not have direct access to the divine world, even at
the level of perception and imagination.Any description of it becomes
metaphorical and symbolic and must be understood and interpreted in such a way
that it fits with the characteristics of the divine world. It should be
interpreted within the boundaries of tanziyyah. Throughout the history of
Islam, the mentioned theological differences and distinctions have influenced
various faculties of Islamic thought and knowledge, including anthropology,
prophethood, revelation, the nature of the Quran, the nature of faith and
disbelief, etc., which have been recorded in detail in theological sources.[27]
Theoretically,
since the Taliban belong to the Hanafi school of thought, they should have also
believed in the theology of Ahl al-Rai. Their supposed intellectual
compatibility with the theology of Ahl al-Rai would have shaped them
differently, improving their characteristics and behavior as a Hanafi Islamist
organization. Practically, however, contrary to the Taliban's claim of being
Hanafi, they are close to Salafists and Ahl al-Hadith.
Throughout
the history of Islam, the problematic ascendance of Ahl al-Hadith theology over
Ahl- al-Rai evolution is linked to various intellectual, political, and
historical events. One could recall the defeat of the Mu'tazila or Mutazilites
as the forerunner of Ahl al-Rai against the Ahl al-Hadith, the retreat of the
Matridians in favor of the Ash'ari, the suppression of philosophy and
intellectualism in the Islamic middle centuries, the dominance dogmatic and
non-critical thinking in the Ottoman era, the collapse of the Hanafi school in
Central Asia, the emergence of Shah Waliullah Dehlavi and the foundation of the
Ahl al-Hadith approach within the Hanafi system, the establishment of the
Deoband school, the birth of Pakistan and the production of the Pakistani
version of Deobandism and finally the spread of Salafist ideas during the Jihad
era among Afghan immigrants in Pakistan as the major turning points in the
course of theological currents.[28]
The
totality of these factors affected the entirety of the intellectual heritage of
Ahl Rai, particularly that of Imam Abu Hanifah, the founder and the chief
ideologic of Hanafi Islamic school thought. Unfortunately, the expansionist
Salafists and Ahl al-Hadith theology are taking over the world of Sunni Islam,
replacing reason, tolerance, and dialogue with dogmatism, intolerance, and
violence. The Taliban are an embodiment of this distorted version of Hanafi
Islam. On issues of faith, theology, and spirituality, the Taliban are
indistinguishable from Ahl al-Hadith. The Taliban are at war with Ahl al-Ra'i
and Muslim rationalists. To understand the secret of the alliance between the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda and recognize the distinctions between the Taliban and ISIS,
one should understand the historical evolution of various Islamic theologies,
particularly those of Ahl al-Rai and Ahl al-Hadith.
Jurisprudence
In
matters of jurisprudence, Daesh is Salafist and does not attribute itself to a
specific school of jurisprudence but takes advantage of all Sunni schools of
jurisprudence. They are more open-minded than the Taliban in this regard. Like
other Salafists, Daesh is not accepting all jurisprudential heritage. They
examine and approach jurisprudence issues according to Ahl al-Hadith's criteria
and discard what they find contrary to the method of Ahl al-Hadith.
Nevertheless, it similarly benefits from the four Islamic religious sects'
traditional sources. Just as they use the views of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim
in their interpretation of Islamic texts, they also use the views of Ibn Hazm,
Ibn Al-Hammam, Nawi, Ibn Qudama, Ibn Hajar, Ibn Al-Jawzi and others, except in
cases where it is incompatible with the Salafist approach. In this sense, the
work of the Salafists and Daesh is more advanced compared to the Taliban.[29]
The
Taliban are vehemently opposed to ijtihad, the independent
reasoning by an expert in Islamic law, or the thorough exertion of a jurist's
mental faculty in finding a solution to a legal question. They also resist any
innovative approach in jurisprudence. Their way of engaging with matters of
jurisprudence is divergent from those of original and historical Hanafi
jurisprudence. The Taliban are influenced by the recent mix of Hanafi-Salafist
way of thinking that has emerged in the era of the decline of Islamic
civilization and focuses on blind imitation and intellectual petrification.[30]
According to the dominant form of
Hanafi jurisprudence adopted by groups like the Taliban, no other school of
jurisprudence is right. They consider converting from one Islamic sect to
another a sin. Their interpretation of Islamic texts and verdicts is not
reflective of the inherent tolerance Hanafi school towards reasoning and
intellectual faculty. The Hanafi school's bottlenecks during the centuries of
decline and collapse of Islamic civilization were not exclusive to the Hanafi
sect only. All Islamic schools of jurisprudence, without exception, have been
impacted by the Islamic world's multiple social and intellectual crises. The
current Hanafism is a regressive form of Hanafism that has distanced itself
from global consciousness. Its connection with the spirit of the time and its
needs have been severed. Today's Hanafism is a dogmatic ideology incapable of
responding to Islamic societies' pressing intellectual and social needs. The
Taliban's endorsement of this version of Hanafism confirms their disconnect
with the realities of time and their ineffective jurisprudential framework.[31]
Nonetheless,
this does not mean that the Salafist jurisprudence, to which ISIS belongs, is
much more advanced than the Taliban jurisprudence. The Salafist jurisprudence,
relying on the original forms of Islamic text, eventually reaches the same
impasse in which the Taliban jurisprudence is caught. The sterility of the
Salafist school has been evident for over two hundred years. At the peak of its
prosperity, the Salafists have not been able to produce a person of the stature
of Ibn Taymiyyah, let alone Ghazali and Ibn Rushd and Ibn Arabi or Maulana
Jalaluddin Muhammad Balkhi. Today, both the Taliban and ISIS jurisprudences are
alien to the spirit of the times and unable to help solve the problems of
Islamic societies. At the level of detail, however, the Taliban jurisprudence
is harsher and more primitive and makes life even more difficult for people.
Morality
and Mysticism
In the
history of Islam, morality and ethics have been intertwined with Sufism and
mysticism. Muslim scholars had written independent books and articles on
theorizing Islamic morality and ethics. It was Sufis and Muslim mystics,
however, which promoted good morals in the society and, in doing so, did not
limit themselves to the practical training of people but also contributed to
the theoretical articulation of Islamic mysticism. As a result of their endless
effort, the jurisprudential face of Islam was refined, and its mystical
character stole many hearts and institutionalized and internalized part of the
moral values among Muslims for centuries. No civilization is complete without
ethics, and Islamic culture remains a crippled and defective civilization
without the precious heritage of Muslim mystics.[32]Like
all branches of Salafism, ISIS is incompatible with Sufism and mysticism,
considers the mystical interpretation of Islam as a deviant interpretation, and
considers Muslim Sufis to be heretics and unbelievers.
The
Taliban, whose intellectual lineage reaches the school of Deoband.Theoretically,
they should not be openly hostile to Sufism. Some prominent Deobandi sheikhs, such
as Ashraf Ali Tahanwi, were Sufis, and there are still Sufis among the
Deobandis. However, this is not the case with the Taliban. Sufism acceptable to
Deobandis is not the general Sufism but rather a Sharia-infused version of
Sufism that has been cut from the main sphere of mysticism and become more
rigid. The conversion of authentic Sufism into a Deobandi version started a
century before Shah Waliullah in India by Sheikh Seyyed Ahmad Sarhindi, known
as Imam Rabbani. Shah Waliullah and his students further developed it.
According to them, the branch of Sufism mixed with theoretical mysticism and
has deep theoretical foundations, such as the teachings of Ibn Arabi,
Suhrawardi, and others, is incompatible with Sharia and is rejected as a
result. On the rejection of real Islamic Sufism, the Deobandis unite with the
Salafists and favor the rigid representations of Sharia over Islamic
spirituality. As a result, jurisprudential Islam prevails over mystical Islam,
and moral and spiritual-oriented religiosity gives way to outward and
Sharia-oriented religiosity.[33]
The
Taliban, however, do not have a middle ground with Sufism as much as the
Deobandi Shaikhs. Due to the spread of Salafist ideas and behaviors in the last
few decades, they are at odds with the Sufis. During the Taliban's first reign,
Sufis were under considerable pressure. The Taliban limited their religious
ritual and practices. In the last twenty years, Takfiri tendencies among the
Taliban have gained more strength, and their relationship with Sufism and
mysticism is darker than in the past. Even if the Taliban reconcile with Sufism
one day, they will only reconcile with its Sharia-infused jurisprudential
version of Sufism, not with the wide range of Muslim mystics and their philosophies.[34]
With the infusions of
radical Salafi/Wahhabi ideologies into the curriculum of the much enlarged
numbers of Deobandi madaaris in Pakistan, the image and of God instilled in
pupils has become almost the exact opposite of the images of God that Khorasani
mystics such as Rumi, Sana’i, ‘Attar, Jami, Ansari, Bidil, Sa’di and others
have depicted, as was briefly discussed earlier. That is, the images constructed of God in
present day Deobandi Madaaris seems to be the epitome of harshness,
vengefulness, reprisal, and His primary tasks are to proscribe, forbid, punish
and keep people accountable for every minor infractions.[35]
Conclusion
To
conclude, the Taliban have differences from ISIS at the foundational (i.e.,
theological, and jurisprudential) and non-foundational (social basis,
organizational characteristics, and political agenda) levels. These
differences, however, are not significant or consequential. A more detailed
examination of the commonalities and differences between the Taliban and ISIS indicates
an overwhelming similarity in their interpretation of Islamic texts, theology,
and history. In simple words, if someone joins the Taliban, he has traveled 80%
of the way to becoming an ISIS member. Only a short distance is left, which
will be completed by joining the organization and pledging allegiance to its
leadership. If there is to be an honest and meaningful confrontation with Daesh
or the Taliban, it is necessary to go to the deepest theological roots and
foundations of their thinking.
[1]Muhammad Moheq
is an Afghan writer and former ambassador in Egypt. He graduated from Sharia
faculty of Herat University, Afghanistan. He has written several books on
extremism and terrorism. Ambassador Muheq is currently the editor of Hasht-e-
Subh Newspaper, the most
popular newspaper in Afghanistan. Contact E-mail:
Muheq.mohammad@gmail.com
[2]Dr.
Riad Amiraoui is professor of Tafseer and Quranic study at Emir Abdelkader
University of Islamic Sciences, Constantine, Algeria. His area of research is
the narratives of the modern Islamic groups, and its correlation or
contradiction with the Islamic sources. He published several critical works on
the modern extremist groups.Contact E-mail: riadamiraoui@gmail.com
[3]Bashir Ansari
holds a PhD in Political Science and he is an established writer on the Muslim
World politics. He writes in Persian, Arabic and English. Contact E-mail: bashir.a.ansariii@gmail.com
[4]- Filippo Boni, Afghanistan 2021: US Withdrawal, the Taliban return
and Regional Geopolitics, Asia Maior, Vol. XXXII, 2021, PP.375-391.
[5]- Makrum
Makarum, Tracing the Historical and Ideological Roots of ISIS: Shi’ite or
Sunni? Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies,6(2), 2016, PP, 209-240.
[6]- Aaron Zelin, Al-Qaeda Announces an Islamic
State in Syria. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2013, April 9.
Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/al-qaeda-announces-islamic-state-syria
(accessed November 15, 2022).
[7]- Reno, Muhammad,
ISIS: Kebiadaban Konspirasi Global, Bandung, Noura Books, 2014.
[8]-Peter
L.Bergen, Holy War Inc., Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. London:
Phoenix. 2002
[9]-Mairaj ul Hamid and Sher Hassan, ISIS and Taliban: US
Strategies and Prospects. Pakistan Journal of American Studies, 2022,
40(1).
[10]-Anne Speckhard and Molly
D. Ellenberg, ISIS in Their Own Words. Journal of Strategic
Security, 2020, 13(1), PP. 82-127.
[11]-Richard Barrett, Beyond the Caliphate, New York, NY:
The Soufan Center, 2017.
[12]- Byman, A.Rathand Byman L. Daniel,Comparing Al
Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets, Brookings Institution, Brookings,
29 April 2015. Available at:
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets
(accessed 25 October 2022).
[13]- Charles Lister, Al-Qaeda
versus ISIS: Competing Jihadist Brands in the Middle East, Middle East Institute,
November 7, 2017. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/al-qaeda-versus-isis-competing-jihadist-brands-middle-east (accessed Sep 25, 2022).
[14]-Ibid
[15]-RobinWright,J. M.Berger, WilliamBraniff, The
jihadi threat: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Beyond. United States Institute of
Peace, 2016.
[16]- Caris Charles,&Reynolds, Samuel,
ISIS Governance in Syria. Middle East Security Report Washington:
Institute for the Study of War,June 13, 2015. Available at: www.
understandingwar.org (accessed on June Sep 19, 2022).
[17]- Jefferis
Jefferis, ISIS Administrative and Territorial Organization, Washington,
IEMed: Mediterranean Yearbook, 2016, P. 41.
[18]- CameronGlenn, Al Qaeda v ISIS: leaders & structure, Wilson
Center, September 28, 2015. Available at:
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-leaders-structure
(accessed Sep 10, 2022).
[19] - MuhammadWaseem, Origins and
growth patterns of Islamic organizations in Pakistan. Religious
Radicalism and Security in South Asia. Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies, 2004, P.17.
[20]- Charles, Lister, Al-Qaeda
versus ISIS: Competing Jihadist Brands in the Middle East, Middle East Institute,
November 7, 2017. Available at:
https://www.mei.edu/publications/al-qaeda-versus-isis-competing-jihadist-brands-middle-east
(accessed Sep 15, 2022).
[21]- Katja Mielke&Nick Miszak, Making Sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A
Social Movement Perspective, Bonn International Center for Conversation, 2017.
[22] - Filippo Boni, Afghanistan 2021: US Withdrawal, the Taliban
return and Regional Geopolitics, Asia Maior, Vol. XXXII, 2021, PP. 375-391.
[23]- RaffaelloPantucci, and AbdulBasit,Post-Taliban Takeover. Counter Terrorist
Trends and Analyses, Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 13(4),
September 2021, P. 1-7.
[24]-
Ibid
[25]-Shadi Hamid&RashidDar,
Islamism, Salafism, and Jihadism: A primer. Brookings Institute,July
15, 2016. Availabe at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer
(accessed November 5, 2022).
[26]-NaseemRazi, Theological Extremism
and Its Effects: Pakistan perspective. Journal of Social Science for
Policy Implications, 2014, 2(4), PP. 59-72.
[27]- Sayed HassanAkhlaq, Taliban and Salafism: A Historical and
Theological Exploration, Open Democracy, 1 December 2013. Available at:
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/taliban-and-salafism-historical-and-theological-exploration
(accessed Sep 21, 2022).
[28]- AhmadRashid, Dar al-Ulum Deo-Band:
Bartanwi Hind men Musalmanu Ka Nizam Talim, A Critical Analysis, Maktaba-e-Jadeed,
Lahore, 2020.
[29]- Farhad Bayani,The Jurisprudence
Trace Behind the DAESH Trench: Theoretical Basis of Islamic Fundamentalism Focusing
on Kurdistan Province of Iran. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and
Islamic Studies, 13(3), 2019, 370-386.
[30]- MeirisonMeirison, The Alleged
Extremism of The Taliban And Its Relation With The Hanafite
Jurisprudence. Jurnal AL-AHKAM, 12(2), 2021, P. 29-44.
[31]-
Ibid
[32]- Abdurezak Abdulahi Hashi, Islamic Ethics: An Outline
of Its Principles and Scope. Revelation and Science, Faculty of Science, International Islamic
University Malaysia, VOL. 1 NO. 03,
2011.
[33]-BrannonIngram, Is the Taliban
Anti-Sufi? Deobandi Discourses on Sufism in Contemporary Pakistan. In Modern
Sufis and the State, Columbia University Press. 2020, PP. 81-91.
[34]- Ibid
[35]- Bashir Ansari,Afghanistan’s
“Traditional” Islam in Transition: Deep Roots of the Taliban Extremism,Modern Afghanistan: The Impact of 40 Years of
War. Edited by M. Nazif Shahrani, Indiana University Press, 2018.
